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The Independent Special 
Prosecutor Case 
In its June 1988 decision, Morrison v. 
Olson,1 the United States Supreme Court 
decided the most politically significant 
case since United States v. Nixon.2 In Morri· 
son v. Olson, the Court by a lopsided 7-1 
vote3 rejected the view that the indepen-
dent special prosecutor established by the 
Ethics in Government Act of 19784 
("Ethics Act") is an unconstitutional 
infringement upon the office of the Presi-
dent. By rejecting the arguments of the 
Reagan administration and the various 
targets of criminal investigations, the 
Court affirmed Congress' ability to con-
trol any possible criminal behavior within 
the executive branch. 
The Ethics Act was a result of the Water-
gate experience, especially the dismissal of 
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. The 
powers of the Watergate Special Prosecu-
tor, however, were created by a Justice 
Department regulation.5 This regulation 
was subject to revocation by the Attorney 
General either on his own initiative or in 
response to presidential directive.6 The 
Ethics Act was enacted to remove from 
the Attorney General and the President 
the plenary authority over the special 
prosecutor, and thus make the special 
prosecutor independent. 
The Ethics Act only applies to the 
criminal investigation and prosecution of 
certain officials within the executive 
branch, e.g., the President, Vice President, 
cabinet members, and certain officials of 
the CIA, Justice Department, and Office 
of the President, and some campaign offi-
cials of the President's campaign commit-
tee/ The Ethics Act is premised on the 
belief that investigation of these officials 
by the Justice Department, which is under 
the President's direct control, creates an 
intolerable conflict of interest.S 
By Professor Arnold Rochvarg 
Although the Ethics Act removes the 
investigation and prosecution of certain 
cases from the Justice Department, the 
Attorney General does have a pivotal role 
under the Ethics Act. If the Attorney Gen-
eral is provided with information "suffi-
cient to constitute grounds to investigate," 
the Attorney General is required to begin 
an investigation.9 If the Attorney General 
determines that there are no reasonable 
grounds for further investigation, the mat-
ter ends there. lo On the other hand, if the 
Attorney General finds reasonable 
grounds to believe further investigation is 
warranted, he is required to refer the mat-
ter to a speCal judicial panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. The special judicial 
panel is then required to appoint someone 
as the independent special prosecutor. This 
panel also defines the jurisdiction of the 
independent special prosecutor. II 
The independent special prosecutor 
. remains in office until the investigation 
and any prosecution are complete. Until 
such time, the independent special prose-
cutor can only be removed for good 
cause.12 This good cause determination is 
made by the Attorney General. 
The Ethics Act has been called into play 
on various occasions during both the 
Carter and Reagan administrations. At 
times, the matter ended with the Attorney 
General and no special prosecutor was 
selected. At other times, however, special 
prosecutors have been appointed, and have 
obtained convictions. The most famous 
investigation under the Ethics Act 
involves the Iran-Contra affair. The con-
troversy in Morrison v. Olson, however, 
concerned the involvement of Justice 
Department officials in a dispute over the 
Environmental Protection Agency's re-
fusal to grant Congress access to docu-
ments pertaining to clean up of hazardous 
waste sites. 
In Morrison, there was a two-fold argu-
ment against the validity of the Ethics Act. 
First, it was argued that the manner in 
which the Act provides for the appoint-
ment and removal of the independent spe-
cial prosecutor was unconstitutional. 
Second, it was argued that the Ethics Act 
violated the separation of powers doctrine 
in that it impermissibly interfered with the 
President's constitutional duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed. 
Appointment 
The first argument was that the unique 
appointment process involving the Attor-
ney General and the special judicial panel 
violates the Appointments Clause of the 
United States Constitution in Art. II, § 2, 
cl.2. This clause requires all "principal" 
officers of the federal government to be 
nominated by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate, but permits "inferior" offi-
cers to be appointed without Senate con-
sent by "the President, the Courts, or the 
Heads of Departments."13 The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia had 
ruled that the independent special prosecu-
tor was a principal officer whose appoint-
ment violates the Appointments Clause. 14 
The court of appeals reasoned that the 
independent special prosecutor is a princi-
pal officer because her power to investigate 
and prosecute was "unchecked" bY:7 the 
President}S The Supreme Court, however, 
held that the independent special prosecu-
tor "clearly falls"16 within the category of 
inferior officers. Although the Court did 
not draw any exact lines between principal 
and inferior officers,17 the Court viewed 
the independent special prosecutor as infe-
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rior because she is subject to removal by 
the Attorney General, has no power to 
formulate policy, and has a limited juris-
diction and tenure fixed by the special judi-
cial panel.!8 
The next issue that needed to be resolved 
under the Appointments Clause was 
whether an inferior officer of one branch 
can be appointed by officials of another 
branch. The challengers of the Ethics Act 
argued that the Appointments Clause only 
permits inferior officers to be appointed 
by superiors in the same branch and, there-
fore, the selection of an executive official 
by a judicial panel is improper. The 
Supreme Court, howeyer, held that Con-
gress can grant to one branch the power to 
appoint inferior officers of another 
branch. The Ethics Act therefore did not 
violate the Appointments Clause.!9 
The Supreme Court's analysis of the 
Appointments Clause is significant for two 
reasons. First, in over two hundred years 
of constitutional history, this is the first 
case where the Court "closely" construed 
the clause.2o Secondly, by giving Congress 
the power to provide for inter-branch 
appointments, the Court gave Congress a 
potentially powerful tool in its power 
struggle with the executive branch. The 
Court did recognize that Congress' power 
to provide for inter-branch appointments 
was "not unlimited" if such an appoint-
ment would create an "incongruity"2! 
(e.g., if Congress gave a court the power to 
appoint the Secretary of Agriculture).22 
Still, Congress' power to create executive 
officials not appointed by the executive 
branch could become a significant method 
of exerting influence over the executive 
branch. 
Removal 
The Ethics Act provides that the inde-
pendent special prosecutor can be removed 
from office only for good cause.23 It was 
argued that this good cause requirement 
unconstitutionally infringed upon the 
President's power to carry out his execu-
tive functions. This argument was based 
on Myers v. United St4tesH in which the 
Supreme Court in 1926 held that Senate 
approval for the removal of a postmaster 
improperly infringed upon the President's 
duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed. One explanation of this case, 
suggested by the Supreme Court in its 
1935 Humphrey's Executoy25 opinion which 
upheld a good cause limitation for removal 
of a Federal Trade Commissioner, was that 
the President's discretion to remove 
"purely executive" officials could not be 
limited by Congress. In Morrison v. Olson, 
however, the Supreme Court backed away 
from this explanation, and wrote that" our 
present considered view"26 is that the con-
stitutionality of any limitation on the Pres-
ide nt's ability to remove government offi-
cials is not whether they are purely 
executive, but whether the removal restric-
tion impedes the President's ability to per-
form his constitutional duties.27 Here, 
although the independent special prosecu-
tor is clearly executive, the Court ruled 
that because the independent special prose-
cutor has no policy making functions and 
has limited jurisdiction, the good cause 
restriction on removal does not "unduly 
trammel" on the President's authority.28 
The Court's holding that any executive 
official's removal can be restricted by Con-
gress as long as the President still is able to 
accomplish his constitutional duties is 
another victory for Congress in its power 
struggle with the executive branch. Moreo-
ver, as with the Appointments Clause anal-
ysis, because the Court's decision offers no 
bright lines, uncertainty as to which execu-
tive officers can be removed only for speci-
fied cause can result in additional tensions 
between the two branches. 
CCseparation of 
powers . ... is a 
system of checks and 
balances. " 
Separation of Powers 
In general, the separation of powers doc-
trine is violated when one branch inter-
feres with another branch's 
constitutionally assigned functions.29 The 
court of appeals had ruled that the Ethics 
Act was unconstitutional because it inter-
fered with the executive branch's obliga-
tion to execute the criminal laws. This was 
true because the Ethics Act gave the power 
of criminal prosecution to someone not 
accountable to the President, and gave an 
Article III court the power to appoint and 
define the jurisdiction of an executive offi-
cer.30 
The Supreme Court did not agree that 
the Ethics Act violated the separation of 
powers doctrine. The Court downplayed 
the role of the special judicial panel 
concluding that, because the judicial panel 
can appoint an independent special prose-
cutor only if the Attorney General author-
izes the appointment, there is no judicial 
usurpation of executive functions. The 
Court found the judicial panel's other 
functions under the Ethics Act to be suffi-
ciently limited. Although the power of the 
judicial panel to terminate the independent 
special prosecutor's tenure was "more 
doubtful,"3! the Court narrowly inter-
preted this power to mean that the special 
judicial panel could only terminate the 
independent special prosecutor if the 
investigation had been completed. By nar-
rowly interpreting this power, the Court 
concluded that there was not significant 
judicial involvement in executive branch 
functions.32 The Court also pointed out 
that unlike other instances where there 
was a separation of powers violation,33 
there was no attempt in the Ethics Act by 
Congress to usurp any executive power. 
The Attorney General's critical role in the 
Ethics Act also illustrates that the execu-
tive branch retains control over the 
criminal prosecution function. 
The Court's analysis in Morrison of the 
separation of powers issue is a clear rejec-
tion of a strict interpretation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. The Court 
adopted a flexible approach which accepts 
the view that separation of powers under 
the federal constitution is not one of the 
separation and isolation of each branch, 
but rather a system of checks and bal-
ances.34 The goal is not to avoid blending 
powers within one branch, but rather to 
avoid the submission of one branch to 
another. Only the sole dissenter, Justice 
Scalia, believed that the Constitution 
requires that all executive power belongs 
to the President, and that any sharing is 
improper.35 The other justices, however, 
adopted a balancing test which permits 
some exercise of executive functions out-
side the executive branch. Although 
Justice Scalia calls this "totality of the cir-
cumstances approach," a "revolution in 
our constitutional jurisprudence,"36 it· 
seems consistent with other Supreme 
Court decisions such as CITe v. Schor37 
which upheld the power of an indepen-
dent agency to decide state law counter-
claims as part of an agency adjudicatory 
proceeding. Schor rejected the argument 
that such authority could not be vested 
outside an Article III court. Morrison is 
also consistent with Humphrey's Executor38 
which implicitly upholds the power of the 
Federal Trade Commission, another inde-
pendent agency, to exercise executive, leg-
islative, and judicial functions. Recent 
arguments that independent agencies are 
unconstitutional39 because of their blend-
ing of powers or because of their indepen-
dence from presidential control should 
surely be rejected in light of Morrison. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court rejected the Reagan 
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administration's position that the inde-
pendent special prosecutor unconstitu-
tionally infringes upon presidential power. 
The Supreme Court thus affirmed Con-
gress' power to control criminal activity 
within the executive branch. If Congress 
will attempt to extend the reasoning of 
Morrison v. Olson to further limit execu-
tive power, this will lead to further battles 
between the legislative and executive 
branches. 
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